Suez shipspotting

m/v Sister 12

Enroute on my delivery gig with Kalizma I got lucky and spotted several old type general cargo ships on the roads of Suez. The one above is called 'Sister 12', IMO 9010010, registry of Comoros with 

an 4x single purchase derricks and a 'R' on the funnel.

IMO number 9010010

Ex names: Fortune Ace, Fortune Ocean

Vessel type: General cargo vessel

Operating status: Active

Flag: Panama

Gross tonnage: 5551 tons

Deadweight: 7050 tons

Length: 98 m

Breadth: 18 m

Year of build: 1991

Builder: Shin Kochi Jyuko - Kochi, Japan

Class: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NKK)

Owner: Shinun Kisen, Imabari, Japan

Looking again in Equasis it seems Sister 12 has not been very well maintained. As for Port State control she has had 109 inspections during her lifespan of which 4 resulted in detention, maybe they already installed revolving doors in the Captain's salon. She seems to have traded in SE Asia until 2022 after which she arrived to the Middle East under the Turkish stewardship of Friends shipping following her sale. 

List of Owners (the list of managers is much longer):
Friends shipping Co SA, registered owner since 25/02/2023 IHS Maritime
Fu Yang Shipping Ltd, registered owner during 12/2013 IHS Maritime
Shin-Un Kisen/ White Tiara Nav, registered owner during 12/2011 IHS Maritime

As she arrived Iskenderun the Turkish PSC descended upon her and subsequently arrested her on basis of 18 deficiencies:

Certificate & Documentation: Crew Certificates Endorsement by flagstate

Emergency Systems: Emergency fire pump 

Emergency Systems: Emergency Lighting Batteries and Switches 

ISM: ISM, related deficiencies 

Life saving appliances: Inflatable Liferafts

Life saving appliances: Lifeboats 

Radio Communications: Operation of GMDSS equipment 

Safety of Navigation: Bridge operation

Safety of Navigation: Echosounder

Structural Conditions: Other (structural condition) 

Structural Conditions: Steering Gear 

Water/Weathertight conditions: Ventilators air pipes ceasing

Working and Living Conditions: Working Conditions Other accident prevention

Working and Living Conditions: Working Conditions Ropes Wires

The basis of detention was:

Emergency Systems: Abandon ship drills Lack of training

Safety of Navigation: Nautical publications Expired

Structural Conditions: Stability/strength, loading info and instruments missing

Before Iskenderun she had a run in with the Red Sea PSC and got following records to show:

22nd October 2023 in Abu Qir, Egypt:

Certificate & Documentation: Documents SOPEP
Life saving appliances: Inflatable Liferafts 
Radio Communications: VHF radio installation 
Safety of Navigation: Magnetic compass 
Structural Conditions: Deck Corrosion

2nd March 2023 in Aden, Yemen

Fire Safety measures: Oil and Dirty Mixtures from Machinery Spaces
Propulsion & aux.: Gauges,thermometers, etc (x2)
Propulsion & aux.: Other (machinery) 
Safety of navigation: Charts 
Safety of navigation: Nautical publications
Structural Safety: Ballast fuel and other tanks 

Structural Safety: Decks corrosion 

Working spaces and accident prevention: Electrical

Looking at above she appears very tired, as she has not had any inspections later on she's maybe ended up in the scrappers yard or possibly she's being drydocked and been given a proper makeover. Time will tell.

* * * * *

Then I saw 2 sisterships that at first I thought was one and the same but after a bit of looking I realized it was different, the one on top I am not able to decipher, the name is just so much diffused that I can only see that it is a name followed by possibly a number. She has an 'R' on the funnel too but it doesn't give much leads.

m/v Jane Doe

m/v Jane Doe

* * * * *

Then m/v Jane Doe is followed by m/v Adonnis, IMO: 9197179, and after having a look at Equasis it appears she has been in the hands of several owners, as the current name suggests, her current operators (if not owners) are Greek interests. As the saying goes, dear child has many names, this one surely does: 

Adonnis since 01/04/2023, 

Sn Queen since 01/10/2009, 

Bright 1 since 01/02/2009, 

Bright Star since 01/09/2008, 

Colima Star since 01/03/2007,

Sun Breeze until 03/2007 (launched as). 

She has also flown several ensigns in her time: St.Kitts and Nevis since 01/09/2024, Palau (Republic of) since 01/04/2023, Panama since 01/02/2009, Korea (Republic of) since 01/09/2008, Mexico since 01/06/2007. As one might surmise she's also been owned by several different companies:

MK European Company SA Registered owner since 26/04/2023 
MK Maritime SA Registered owner since 13/10/2009 
Bright Shipping CO LTD Registered owner since 01/09/2008 

m/v Adonnis

Gross tonnage: 7816 (during 1999)

DWT: 11478
Type of ship: General Cargo Ship (during 1999)

Keel laid: 

Year of build: 1999

Yard: Miura Shipbuilding, Saiki, Japan
Engine Type: Akasaka Tekkosho, 7UEC33LS, 5390kW

Aux engines: 3x 480kW Daihatsu 6DL-20

GT: 7816
Length: 109,3 meters
Width: 19,8 meters

Status: In Service/Commission (since 28/01/2013)

ISM Manager: H&P Ship management Co SA 92-94, Kolokotroni Street, 185 35, Piraeus, Greece, since 28/04/2023, Ship manager/Commercial manager: MK European Company SA Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake, Majuro MH 96960, Marshall Islands, since 26/04/2023, Registered owner: As above. Class: She started with the Japanese NKK and was transferred to Korean register and nowadays seems to be some non-IACS Capital Register of Shipping.

m/v Adonnis

Looking at her port state control history it seems fairly consistent, 66 inspections in total during her lifespan, she was kept seemingly in a good condition. Her inspections has been carried out at first in SE Asia, NZ and Australia, then as she's changed trading areas she's been at Thailand, Vietnam, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, PNG, India and Bangladesh. Since 2023 her PSC's have been in the Red Sea. 

The findings looks pretty minor, the latest 2023 PSC in Aden reported following findings:

Fire Safety measures: Fire fighting equipment and appliances

Life saving appliances: Distress flares

In 2009 when she called Tuticorin as 'Bright Star', India it seems the sh*t hit the fan and PSC inspectors went out on town with her and then detained her for a whopping 15 deficiencies in total. Grounds of detention was listed as:

Cargoes: Document of compliance dangerous goods
Fire Safety measures: Fire detection
ISM related deficiencies: Company responsibility and authority
Radiocommunications: MH/HF radio installation

Then followed by additional deficiencies:

Accommodation: Medical equipment
Cargoes: Other cargo
Fire Safety measures: Ready availability of fire fighting equipment
Life saving appliances: Lifeboats
Life saving appliances: Lifejackets
Life saving appliances: Training/instruction manual
Mooring arrangements (ILO 147): Ropes, wires
Operational deficiencies: Muster list
Propulsion & aux.: Bilge pumping arrangements
Ship's certificates and documents: Other certificates

It wasn't a good day for the Master & crew, I bet that the office in Tokyo was also having hot phonelines. 

m/v Adonnis

Then it also transpires that just after she was only 6 months old she had an incident in Australia and a report can be found on www.atsb.gov.au in the Marine safety investigation report no. 150. The tidbits reads as follows:

"The Panamanian flag general cargo vessel Sun Breeze berthed at the West Australian port of Bunbury on 16 August 1999 to load a cargo of sawn timber. The vessel loaded packs of timber of various sizes, most of which had no weights marked on them. During loading, the master estimated weights of cargo loaded in each of the vessel’s two hatches by draught survey. When the hatches were full, the weight of cargo loaded on the hatch tops and deck was limited by the master’s requirement to maintain a minimum metacentric height (GM) of 50 cm. After loading was completed on 21 August, the vessel's GM, after allowing for free surface effects in certain tanks, was calculated to be 47 cm. After lashing of the deck cargo was completed, Sun Breeze sailed at 1800 the same day for China. The vessel was upright when the harbour master piloted her from the port. After the harbour master disembarked, the engine revolutions were increased to sea speed at 1830. When the master left the bridge, the 3rd mate changed the steering from manual to autopilot, at which time the ship started turning to starboard on its own accord. He changed back to manual steering, ordering helm to bring the vessel back on course. The vessel then seemed to him to list initially to port before listing to starboard. The master returned to the bridge, by which time the list was about 15° or 20° to starboard. He stopped the engine and the list increased before settling at about 25°. The vessel lost some packs of timber from no. 1 hatch top over the side at this time. A distress message was sent out at about 1848 before the master anchored the vessel at 1900. The harbour master went out to the ship and non-essential crewmembers were disembarked by a tug. The master corrected the list by ballasting side tanks. He advised the owner of the ship of the situation and obtained permission from the harbour master to re-enter the port after a surveyor had verified the vessel’s stability. The vessel berthed at Bunbury once more at 1310 on the 22nd August. The cargo was restowed and secured and the amount of deck cargo was reduced, after which the vessel sailed for the discharge port in China, where it arrived safely on 10 September 1999."

"The master, who had been at sea for 34 years, had taken delivery of the vessel from the shipyard. He had sailed as mate for five I years on general cargo ships, log carriers and bulk carriers and had 22 years experience in command of various vessels, mainly bulk carriers. He had been master of wood chip carriers for 10 years and had been with his present company since he obtained a master’s certificate in 1977. Crew was in total 20, (18 Filipino, one Japanese, one Korean)."

Sun Breeze general arrangement

Credit: ATSB

Luckily she didn't capsize but settled at the angle of loll. (Editor)

"Two scenarios for the incident Two possible scenarios would explain the shift of cargo on board Sun Breeze on 21 August 1999. 

1. The vessel sailed with negative GM, resulting in an angle of loll V which caused the shift of cargo. 

2. The vessel was tender at sailing and rolled under the influence of the swell, possibly also heeling under the influence of the rudder. The unsecured cargo in the tween decks and lower holds shifted. The vessel listed, causing the deck cargo to shift. Lashings on the deck cargo opened, resulting in the loss of nine packages of timber over the side. At best the vessel’s stability at sailing was marginal and substantially less than the master calculated. This was due in part to insufficient allowance for free surface effects in those ballast and fuel tanks that were not pressed up and erroneous data in the ship’s approved stability book. The cargo in the holds was not secured. There is no dispute about this. There was a level of broken stowage underdeck, but the degree of broken stowage cannot be determined. The shift of cargo of 0.5 m in the lower holds and 0.25 m in the tween decks would account for a list in excess of 15°. The shift of deck cargo would also have contributed to the list. It would seem that marginal or negative stability and the unsecured cargo combined to bring about the shift of the cargo. The safety of the ship and its crew were compromised: 

• through lack of information on the nature and weight of the cargo, and the disregard of loading requirements as detailed in Marine Orders Part 42 

• by the unreliable nature of the approved stability data."

"Conclusions 

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual. Based on all the evidence available, the following factors are considered to have contributed to the incident: 

1. All fuel, diesel, fresh water and some ballast tanks were slack, reducing the vessel’s stability. 

2. The cargo in the holds and tween decks was not secured to prevent movement in a seaway in accordance with the approved cargo securing manual. 

3. The ship’s stability was based on an inclining experiment that did not meet IMO approved standards. As a result, the position of the lightship centre of gravity is in question. 

4. The stability information supplied to the ship contained incorrect data on free surface moments. 

5.The master did not have a copy of the code of safe practice for the carriage of timber deck cargoes, neither did the ship’s approved cargo securing manual include timber deck cargoes. 

6.The stability calculations did not allow for absorption of water by the deck cargo or for consumption of fuel from low tanks once the vessel was at sea. In addition, the Inspector considers that the master would have been justified in delaying loading of the cargo until he was given all information necessary to ensure the ship's safety."

Loading wire rod rolls in Point Lisas in 2007

Credit: ostinn (shipspotting)

Here she is as Colima Star, leaving Marystown Canada in 9th April 2007

Credit: ostinn (shipspotting)